Inter-connectedness is one important aspect in measuring the degree of systemic risk arising in the banking system. In this paper, this aspect besides the degree of commonality and volatility are measured using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), dynamic Granger causality tests and a Markov regime switching model. These measures can be used as leading indicators to detect pressures in the financial system, in particular the banking system. There is evidence that the inter-connectedness level together with degree of commonality and volatility among banks escalate substantially during the financial distress. It implies that less systemically important banks could become more important in the financial system during the abnormal times. Therefore, the list of systemically important banks as regulated in the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK) should be updated more frequently during the period of financial distress. Hal ini berarti bahwa bank-bank yang sebelumnya tidak termasuk kategori bank berdampak sistemik bisa menjadi memiliki dampak sistemik pada periode sistem keuangan mengalami tekanan. Oleh karena itu, daftar bank-bank yang berdampak sistemik sebagaimana diatur dalam UU PPKSK perlu untuk diperbaharui secara lebih rutin selama periode pasar keuangan dalam tekanan.
Introduction
Initiated by depreciating Baht Thailand, banking crisis coupled with currency crisis during financial crisis 1997 had hurt the East Asian economies harshly. Some findings reveal that damage stemming from this crisis accounts for 30 per cent of GDP for South Korea and Thailand and 20 per cent of GDP for Malaysia and Indonesia in terms of the cost of bank recapitalization (Goldstein, Kaminsky, & Reinhart, 2000) . For Indonesia itself, not only is the cost for resolving banking crisis costly, but it also prolongs up to five years with total general public loss amount of 40 per cent of GDP (McLeod, 2004) .
Following this crisis, many has developed an early warning model with the purpose of predicting the next crisis.
After a decade of the Asian financial crisis, the world is shocked with the collapse of a number of financial institutions in the US which is categorized as 'too big to fail' and then it spreads throughout the global economies becoming global financial crisis and countries affiliating to the US economy suffer. Indonesia experienced the same pressure during the global financial crisis 2008 -2009, particularly in currency and banking system which ended up with a bail-out for Bank of Century. Both experiences of the Asian financial crisis 1997 -1998 and global financial crisis 2008 -2009 have underscored an important lesson of which once a financial institution fails, it can easily spread to the other financial institutions becoming a negative sentiment or even triggering another collapse of a financial institution, regardless prolonging debate of the decision of the bail-out for Bank of Century in Indonesia. As a consequence, it is imperative to assess systemic risks of a financial institution seeing its ability to spread quickly to other financial institutions within the financial system which may eventually damage the whole economy.
After the global financial crisis 2008 -2009 or known as subprime mortgage crisis, many studies have been performed investigating the systemic risks of a financial institution (Billio, Getmansky, Lo, & Pelizzon, 2010) . Instances of these studies are a study by the Bank of England examining funding liquidity risk using a network model to evaluate probability of a bank default (Aikman et al., 2009) and a study of measuring systemic risk of twelve major banks in the U.S. using ex-ante probabilities of bank default and correlations of forecasted asset returns (Huang, Zhou, & Zhu, 2009 ). However, most of those studies focus on advanced economies, in particular the U.S. economy. An emerging economy like Indonesia may pose different risks as its financial institutions have different characteristics compared with financial institutions in the advanced countries.
Having passed in March 2016, the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK) is a pivotal role for the Indonesia's financial system focusing on banking system as banks dominate the Indonesia's financial sector. One of the key features of the law is establishment of list of banks categorized as systemically important based on their interconnectivity, capacity and complexity, which is predetermined evaluated every six months (Syaifullah et al., 2016) . Nevertheless, this arrangement could possibly carry a risk as interconnectedness among financial institutions, in particular banks, are likely to escalate during financial distress implying that less systemically important banks could become more important in the financial system during the abnormal times.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes literature reviews on measuring systemic risks of financial institutions, while Section 3 explains both the methodology and the data used. Section 4 then discusses the findings and results and finally Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
A number of studies has been conducted to describe and measure systemic risk of the financial institutions. One important concept of systemic risk is that a systemic event may affect a number of financial institutions transmitting failures from one institution to another, so that a measure of systemic risk should be able to identify the risk of systemic institutions, which are so large and interconnected exposing negative spillover effects on others (Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013; Hartmann, Straetmans, & Vries, 2005) . It is also imperative to map out relationships or inter-linkages among financial institutions in order to be able to identify systemic risk as well as financial fragility (Allen & Gale, 2007) . Thus, to measure the systemic risk on the Indonesia's financial institutions, this paper focuses from those points of view. Since the Indonesia's financial institutions are dominated by banks, in terms of assets, this paper concentrates to measure systemic risk on Indonesian banks.
Theoretical framework lying beneath analyses in this paper refers to relationships among the Indonesian banks which may spread either through fundamental shocks or negative externalities, as well as network effects or escalating volatility (Allen & Gale, 2007; Anandarajan, Lee, & Anandarajan, 2001; Brunnermeier, 2008; Daníelsson & Peñaranda, 2011; Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Shin, 2012) . Such relationship or interconnectivity is one of the important features of systemic risks described in the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK). Billio et al. (2010) divides empirical literatures of systemic risks into three groups. The first group deliberates studies on bank contagion, while the second gives attention to crises of banks, booms of lending and aggregate fluctuations. The last group focuses on spillover effects, contagion of financial institutions and joint crashes in financial markets. In studying the bank contagion, the first group bases on the autocorrelation of the number of bank returns and bank defaults as well as bank exposures among others meaning that a bank default may make other banks insolvent (de Bandt & Hartmann, 2000) . Other studies categorized in this group use correlations of bank asset portfolios and default probabilities (Lehar, 2005) , besides bank trading risk similarities (Wong, 2008) and bank failures with maximum likelihood estimation of cumulative negative abnormal returns (Bartram, Brown, & Hund, 2007) as measures of systemic risks.
The second group of the studies concentrates on ratios of bank capital and its liabilities such that macro fundamentals can have noteworthy predictive power in order to detect systemic risks in the banking sector (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, & Billings, 1997; Hardy & Pazarbaşioğlu, 1999) .
Other studies in this group use indexes of credit derivatives prices (Bhansali, Gingrich, & Longstaff, 2008) The third group of the studies brings together spillover effects, contagion of financial institutions and joint crashes in financial markets as measures of systemic risks. This group uses such as correlations resulted from Granger causality tests between exchange rates and interest rates before and after the Asian crisis (Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart, 1998) and simple correlations to measure volatility changes during the Asian crisis (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001) . They find similar results finding that there were many causal correlations detected during the crisis.
In order to measure the systemic risks, this paper follows Billio et al. (2010) who measure the degree of connectivity among the U.S. financial institutions. Due to the complexity of the financial system in the U.S., they define the system incorporating banks, brokers, hedge funds and insurance companies.
Rather than following them in dividing into four types of financial institutions, this paper stresses on just banks since the Indonesia's financial sector is dominated by banks in terms of assets. Adopting Billio et al. (2010) methods, this paper uses principal component analyses, regime switching models and dynamic granger causality tests as measures of systemic risk on the Indonesia's banking system.
Methodology and Data

Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Principal component analysis (PCA) can detect empirically increased commonality among the asset returns, for instance banking asset returns. This method models variance structure of a set of variables using linear combinations of the variables by decomposing the covariance matrices, so that it can measure the degree of commonality among the variables (Barber & Copper, 2012; Billio, Caporin, Pelizzon, & Sartore, 2012) . For instance, asset returns are driven by a linear K-factor model, the first K principal components explain most of the time-series variation in returns.
Where [ ′ ] = 0 for any ≠ ′ , so the covariance matrix ∑ of the vector of returns
Where contains eigenvalues of ∑ falong its diagonal and is the matrix of subsequent eigenvectors.
The unit length linear combination of the original variables with maximum variance is expressed by the first principal component, while subsequent principal components maximize variance among unit length linear combinations which are orthogonal to the former components (Johnson & Wichern, 2002) .
Markov Regime Switching Model
Following Billio et al. (2010) , the next measure of systemic risk can be captured through sudden regime-changes in the volatilities of the expected returns of financial institutions, which is in this case they are banks. This regime-switching model is proposed because in general the linear models are not able to capture regime shifts or discrete changes which commonly happens during financial distresses. The regime switching model proposed in this paper is a simple two-state model for the banks in order to get a measure of systemic risk. Such two-state model is empirically able to gauge the possibility of a regime switching from a normal to a distressed financial regime (Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Duong & Swanson, 2011; Guidolin, 2011a Guidolin, , 2011b . The composite index return is characterized by volatility in each of the two states of the Markov chain , , which is estimated for both low and high volatility states. This paper follows the convention that , = 0 is defined as the low-volatility regime and , =
Where the -th element reflects the probability of transitioning from regime in period − 1 to regime in period . An alternative measure of systemic risk is constructed by taking average of probabilities of being in the high-volatility states of different groups of banks, including banks book four, banks book three as well as banks book two, so that:
Where , is simply average of all probabilities of high volatility regime among all banks. Evidence of interdependence between banks is present when there is a noteworthy increase in the average probability , .
Dynamic Granger Causality
The third measure of systemic risk used in this paper is Granger causality which is performed dynamically rolling-over 36 months. Not only is the degree of interconnectedness important, but also the direction of the relationship is also essential. Classical Granger causality can help predict such direction (Billio et al., 2010) . The linear inter-relationships can be represented with the following model:
Where , , , are the estimated coefficients, is the maximum lag considered, while and are two uncorrelated errors following white noise processes.
Causality denotes that causes when is significantly different from zero and causes when is significantly different from zero. If both hypotheses are true, it implies that there is a two-way or feedback relationship between the series. The number of maximum lags selection is based on Bayesian
Information Criterion. The results of the causality tests are based on F-test with null hypotheses that or are equal to zero.
Data
The data used for the estimation is a monthly data for banking stock 
Empirical Results and Analysis
This section discusses estimated measures of systemic risks as described in Section 3 using historical data of monthly return of banking stock indexes, consisting of four different measures. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
As the central point of a systemic risk is commonality among a number of financial institutions, this first measure captures the commonality through the PCA analysis which is able to extract the main components driving variations among the institutions. As banks dominate the Indonesia's financial sector in terms of assets, this paper focuses on the banking sector. Table 1 The results in Table 1 show that during the periods of financial distress, degree of commonality as banks and banks book 4 may also be influenced by domestic shocks, such as interest rate cap announced by the Financial Services Authority. The intervention from the regulator seems seriously hit banks book 4. In addition, the estimates using more recent sample period (2013 ( -March 2016 signal that pressures on banking sector have cooled down.
Markov Regime Switching Model
The second systemic risk measure is the estimate of the Markov regime switching model presented in Figure 1 . The composite index return is characterized by volatility in each of the two states of the Markov chain , , which is estimated for both low and high volatility states. This paper follows the convention that , = 0 is defined as the low-volatility regime and , = 1 is defined as the highvolatility regime.
The graph in Figure 1 shows the probability of being in the high-volatility state (Z=1) for the whole sample for the banking composite index return. Banks had been in a high-volatility state from the fourth quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 1994 and subsiding thereafter until mid-1997. This later period is called period of the "calm before the storm" (Billio et al., 2010) . During the Asian financial crisis since 1997 Indonesia's banks had been in the high-volatility state and descending by the end of 2003. It shows how severe Indonesia's banking system hit by the crisis and it takes a long time to
recover. There were also sparks of growing probability of being in the high-volatility regime at the end of 2004 at which Indonesia had a problem on its mutual funds, but the probability was quite to the overall probability of being in the high volatility regime during financial distress (see Figure 2 and 3). Figure 2 
Dynamic Granger Causality
The third measure of banking systemic risk is resulted from linear Granger causality test which is dynamically performed among 36-monthly returns of banks with sample period from January 1997
to March 2016. Based on causal interconnectedness, this systemic risk measure may capture both contagion effects between banks as well as exposures among them to a common factor, such as the Indonesian equity market.
Upward trends in Figure 2 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
Inter-connectedness is one important aspect in measuring the degree of systemic risk arising in the banking system. It can be used as a leading indicator to detect growing pressures in the financial system, in particular the banking system. There is evidence that the inter-connectedness level together with degree of commonality and volatility among banks escalate substantially during the financial distress. It implies that less systemically important banks could become more important in the financial system during the abnormal times. Therefore, the evaluation period of six months in setting up list of systemically important banks as regulated in the UU PPKSK could possibly carry a risk during the period of financial distress. During the abnormal times, the list should be updated more frequently, for instance in a monthly basis.
In addition, there are still some drawbacks in this paper. One drawback is the linearity assumption used in estimating the dynamic Granger causality tests as well as in estimating the Markov regime switching model. The relationships among banks may not be linear. Therefore, estimating nonlinear Granger causality tests and also nonlinear regime switching model can be a worth extension of this paper in the future. Autoregressive lags may also be possible to be incorporated in the regime switching model.
